China-Burma-India WWII

American soldiers attached to a Chinese division send a message from the field. (U.S. Army Military History Institute)

After the recall of General Joseph W. Stilwell to the United States by President Roosevelt on October 18, 1944, Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer was sent to China as the commanding general of U.S. forces in the theater. Wedemeyer arrived in China on October 31, 1944. In the face of a major Japanese offensive that threatened allied Chinese-American control of southwest China, including the major air and ground base areas of Chongqing, in Sichuan, and Kunming, in Yunnan Province, Wedemeyer suggested ALPHA Plan to organize 36 Chinese infantry divisions into a single field force commanded by a Chinese general but staffed jointly by Chinese and American officers. Under the plan, the United States was to train, equip, and supply the force, which was to be known as ALPHA Force. The 36-division commitment to the force amounted to about 15 percent of the total Nationalist Chinese army. Despite his early opposition to the establishment of such a force, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, whose forces were threatened by the Japanese, reluctantly accepted the plan. Nonetheless, because he was afraid that Chinese Communist forces might attack the Nationalists, Chiang kept some of the best Nationalist troops in reserve in the Chongqing area, providing only grudging support and mediocre forces to Wedemeyer.

In January 1945, Wedemeyer, acting in his capacity as the chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek (he was dual-hatted as commander of American forces and Chiang's chief of staff), established two subordinate commands to man and train the Chinese forces. The first, the Chinese Combat Command, was designed as an advisory group, placing American officers in positions to give advice to Chinese commanders at all echelons, regiment and above. The Chinese Combat Command was led by U.S. Army major general Robert B. McClure. The second command created by Wedemeyer was the Chinese Training Command, led by Brigadier General Joseph W. Middleton. The Chinese Training Command eventually operated seven separate training centers and schools, most of which were located in the vicinity of Kunming, Yunnan Province.

ALPHA Force trained, developed, and concentrated itself in the area surrounding Kunming. It was commanded by Nationalist Army general He Yingjin, who had previously held the position of chief of staff of the Nationalist Army and for whom General Stilwell had expressed great respect.

Taking advantage of air support from Major General Claire Lee Chennault's 14th Air Force, strategic bombing support from the U.S. Army Air Force's 20th Bombardment Group, and the U.S.-established supply and sustainment system, General He Yingjin finally began an offensive against the Japanese in spring 1945. Responding to a Japanese advance toward Kunming from the area of Guilin, in the southeastern province of Guizhou, ALPHA Force divisions began a counteroffensive on April 14, 1945. This ALPHA Force campaign moved east from a locus around Zhejiang, in Hunan, near the Guangxi border. In all, General He Yingjin committed forces of six Chinese armies, the 94th Army, the New Sixth Army, the 74th Army, the 100th Army, the 18th Army, and the 73d Army. Between April 18 and June 7, 1945, ALPHA Force armies and divisions forced Japanese troops to retreat to the positions they had occupied before the offensive. However, Chinese losses in the campaign were heavier than Japanese losses.

The ALPHA Force Plan never had time to reach fruition before World War II ended, but the advisory system, combined with the leadership of General He Yingjin, succeeded in blunting the Japanese advances in the Zhejiang campaign. A subsequent American-conceived campaign, called the BETA Plan, designed to attack Canton and Hong Kong using the ALPHA Force, was never implemented. The Japanese surrender after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki ended the war.

REFERENCES John H. Boyle, China and Japan at War: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1972); Ch'i Hsi-sheng, Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse, 1937-45 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1982); F. F. Liu, A Military History of Modern China, 1924-1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956); U.S. Army Center for Military History, China Offensive, 5 May 1945-2 September 1945 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995.