Tuesday, February 2, 2010

INDIAN OCEAN, JAPANESE NAVAL OPERATIONS IN (MARCH–MAY 1942) –AN OVERVIEW

Posted by Mitch Williamson at 8:38 PM





Among British casualties in Aichi D3A1 'Val' attacks were HMS Hermes (the world's first carrier to be sunk by carrier aircraft), and the cruisers Cornwall and Dorsetshire. The first British carrier actually designed as such, HMS Hermes was built along the lines of a light cruiser. She carried six 140-mm (5.5-in) guns, as it was not believed that aircraft alone could repel enemy surface attack.


Mogami-class Japanese Heavy Cruiser: From 1 April 1942 CruDiv 7 based from Mergui, Burma joined with CruDiv 4 to participate in the Indian Ocean raids. Mikuma, Mogami and destroyer Amagiri detached and formed the "Southern Group", which hunted for merchant shipping in the Bay of Bengal, while Chokai, DesRon 4's light cruiser Yura and destroyers Ayanami, Yugiri, Asagiri and Shiokaze covered the northern areas. During the operation, the "Southern Group" claimed kills on 7,726-ton British merchant vessel Dardanus and 5,281-ton British merchant vessel Ganara and the 6,622-ton British merchant vessel Indora, en route from Calcutta to Mauritius..

By late March 1942, the Japanese placed primary importance on the elimination of British naval forces in the Indian Ocean that might threaten the oil-rich East Indies. Imperial Headquarters therefore decided to attack Colombo and Trincomalee on Ceylon (Sri Lanka), off India. The Japanese hoped this move would force the British westward; spread panic in India and cause the British to divert resources there from Burma; and open the way to the conquest of Madagascar, which would enable them to cut Allied supply lines to the Pacific, Egypt, and the Soviet Union.
British Vice Admiral James Somerville commanded the Eastern Fleet, with 29 ships. He split his ships into Force A and Force B. The main body, Force A, consisted of his fastest ships: 2 fleet aircraft carriers, 1 battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 6 destroyers. Force B consisted of 1 light carrier, 4 old R-class battleships, and a hodgepodge of 11 old cruisers and destroyers. Somerville faced a superior Japanese force under Vice Admiral Nagumo Chüichi. His First Air Fleet consisted of 5 large aircraft carriers (the Kaga remained in Japan), 4 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 11 destroyers. 

En route to Ceylon, the Japanese attacked Port Darwin in Australia and, on 27 February, sank the U.S. seaplane tender Langley, bound for Java with aircraft. On 23 March, the Japanese took the Andaman Islands, securing the sea route to Rangoon from Singapore. Two days later, Nagumo’s ships entered the Indian Ocean. 

Earlier, on 7 March, the battleships Haruna and Kongo had shelled Christmas Island, located 190 miles southwest of Java and considered important for its phosphate resources. A Japanese task force, commanded by Rear Admiral Kyuji Kubo and consisting of 3 cruisers, 2 destroyers, and transports, then arrived. Japanese troops forced the island’s surrender on 31 March. The U.S. submarine Seawolf scored a hit on Kubo’s flagship, the light cruiser Naka, which had to be towed to Singapore for repairs. Several months later, the Japanese withdrew from Christmas Island because it was unsuitable for any military facilities. 

The attack on Ceylon, code-named Operation C, consisted of a strike against Colombo on 5 April and another on Trincomalee on 9 April. The British believed the Japanese planned to attack Ceylon beginning on 1 April, and Somerville stationed his ships south of Ceylon on 31 March. 

Late on 2 April, however, Somerville, who feared a Japanese submarine attack and a daylight air attack on his ships, split his fleet. He sent the majority to Addu Atoll, a small refueling base in the Maldives some 600 miles southwest of Ceylon. He also dispatched the cruisers Dorsetshire and Cornwall to Colombo and the light carrier Hermes and the destroyer Vampire to Trincomalee. Immediately after the British ships reached Addu Atoll on 4 April, the Japanese were sighted 360 miles south of Ceylon. The main British force was now too far away to attack the Japanese, but bases on Ceylon were put on high alert. Somerville realized that he had blundered and recalled the two cruisers to Addu Atoll. The Hermes and Vampire were to rendezvous once they were finished fueling. 

At 8:00 A.M. on Easter, 5 April, Japanese aircraft struck Colombo. Forty-two British fighters met the attackers, which were protected by escorting fighters. The Japanese planes destroyed shipping and paid particular attention to shore installations: railroad yards, repair shops, and the airfield. High-altitude Japanese bombers sank an immobilized armed merchant cruiser and a destroyer, and they severely damaged a submarine tender. The raid, completed by 8:35, cost the Japanese only 7 aircraft, whereas the British lost 25. Once the Japanese had recovered their planes, a floatplane spotted the Dorsetshire and Cornwall at sea, and Nagumo launched 88 aircraft against them. The Japanese sank both British heavy cruisers in short order. Somerville had set out from Addu Atoll to engage the Japanese but failed to locate them. When Force B joined him the next day, he regarded it as a liability and promptly dispatched it to Kenya. 

Nagumo, meanwhile, moved his ships toward Trincomalee. Believing the Japanese were next going to attack Addu Atoll, Somerville positioned his ships off the atoll, 1,000 miles from the Japanese fleet. With the threat to India’s coast and the sinking of merchant ships, the British decided to cede the eastern Indian Ocean to the Japanese and sent Force A to the western coast of India. The Hermes and Vampire were ordered to hug the coast and join Force A. 

The Japanese raid on Trincomalee, beginning at 7:25 A.M. on 9 April and conducted by 91 bombers and 38 fighters, was met by 23 British aircraft. The Japanese planes found no warships in the harbor, but they did sink a merchant ship there. They concentrated on the shore installations and airfield and shot down 9 British Hurricane fighters, as well as 5 Blenheim bombers sent against the Japanese carrier Akagi as she retired (the British bombers scored no hits). That afternoon, Japanese aircraft spotted the Hermes and Vampire at sea. Nagumo sent 90 aircraft against them, and the Hermes, with no planes aboard, and her escorting destroyer were promptly sent to the bottom. 

As part of this same operation, the Japanese convoyed their 18th Infantry Division to Rangoon without incident. It arrived there on 7 April. Also, a Japanese raiding force attacked the sea-lanes off India’s east coast. This Malaya Force, commanded by Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburo, consisted of the light carrier Ryujo, 5 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, and 4 destroyers. Between 5 and 6 April, it sank 19 merchant ships (92,000 tons) and damaged 3 others. Air strikes by Japanese aircraft flying from Burma brought this total up to some 185,000 tons of shipping sunk, and Japanese submarines operating off India’s west coast sank an additional 32,000 tons. 

By 10 April, the Japanese had pushed the British navy out of most of the Indian Ocean, created a buffer against British naval raids on the East Indies and other Japanese possessions, and destroyed significant British military assets. Nagumo concluded that he had achieved his objectives and ordered the First Air Fleet to return to Japan. His fleet had been at sea for many months, and its ships badly needed refitting. 

Ultimately, their Indian Ocean victory fueled a belief in their own invincibility among the Japanese and led to the overexpansion of their empire. The extended Japanese Indian Ocean operation also meant that many of the ships were unavailable for the next big sea fight, the Battle of the Coral Sea in May.

References
Andrieu d’Albas, and Emmanuel Marie Auguste. Death of a Navy: Japanese Naval Action in World War II. Trans. Anthony Rippon. New York: Devin-Adair, 1957.
Dull, Paul S. The Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1978.
Roskill, Stephen W. The War at Sea. Vol. 2, The Period of Balance. London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1956.
Thomas, David A. Japan’s War at Sea: Pearl Harbor to the Coral Sea. London: A. Deutsch, 1978.

 

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