China-Burma-India WWII

8-10 December 1941

At dawn on the morning of 8 December, following the first bombing raid on Singapore, a JNAF C5M two-seater reconnaissance aircraft flew over that island, its crew reporting on visible effects of the bombing raid and confirming that the apparently undamaged capital ships were still in harbour. Whilst delighted with the news that they had not sailed, the Japanese High Command decided that they must not be allowed to interfere with the landings at Singora, where they would wreak havoc amongst the transports, and a torpedo-bomber attack against them was planned. The Japanese were fully aware of the threat posed by the two mighty ships, which they considered to be more powerful than their own battleships Kongo and Haruna, which were currently patrolling off the south coast of Indo-China as distant cover to the landings.

Later that same day, at 1735, the Prince of Wales and Repulse belatedly put to sea with an escort provided by four destroyers; this small but potentially powerful fleet was designated Force Z. Heading northwards at full speed, Admiral Phillips' declared intention was to intercept the large concentration of Japanese transports off Singora. He had requested that air reconnaissance of the area be made on the 9th and 10th, and that his force be afforded fighter protection while in the vicinity of Singora, where he expected to be at daylight on the 10th. The loss of Kota Bharu, Gong Kedah and Machang airfields, together with the unserviceability of Alor Star due to demolitions and Sungei Patani due to bombing, made this latter request now little more than a pious hope. Indeed, even as Force Z sailed, Phillips was advised that fighter protection was not possible. Unfortunately, the signal failed to make it clear that the lack of available fighter protection applied only to the morning of the 10th off Singora, as had been the specific request, whereas it would seem that Phillips was under the mistaken impression that fighter protection would not be available under any circumstances.

Initially luck was with Force Z when, early next morning, the crew of a JNAF reconnaissance C5M reported that Prince of Wales and Repulse were still in harbour, having mistaken two large merchantmen for the warships, but at midday a Japanese submarine signalled Japanese Naval HQ with the news that the ships were in fact at sea. All Japanese cruisers providing cover for the landing were ordered to launch their spotter floatplanes to search for the British fleet, while torpedo-armed G3Ms and G4Ms of the 22nd Air Flotilla at Saigon were scrambled to carry out a night attack. However, despite long searches subsequently carried out by the strike force, no sightings were made. The reason for the Jack of Japanese success in locating Force Z was due to a sudden change of course and plan by Admiral Phillips. During the early evening the task force reached a point level with Kota Bharu when the Prince of Wales' aircraft-warning radar picked up blips of three approaching aircraft. Then, at 1720, the rain clouds cleared and a Japanese floatplane was seen. Before long two more floatplanes appeared. With surprise gone, Phillips decided that the risk of continuing was too high and, at 2015, set course for Singapore at top speed.

At around midnight Phillips received a signal from Singapore advising him of a reported landing at Kuantan. Force Z changed course to intercept, but the reported landing proved to be no more than a probable light reconnaissance. Meanwhile, the British fleet had been tracked by another Japanese submarine and, at 10 15, was spotted by a C5M floatplane. Time was now beginning to run out for Force Z. At 1113, the first bombers and torpedo-bombers appeared - eight G3Ms of the Mihoro Ku, followed by nine torpedo-armed G3Ms of the Genzan Ku - which targeted Repulse. The Prince of Wales was the target of the next wave of Genzan Ku torpedo bombers, two torpedoes striking the ship; one struck home on the port side aft, the other abaft Y turret: her steering failed and both propeller shafts stopped. The pride of the Eastern Fleet rapidly took a list to port, and her speed dropped. By 1230, it was all over except for the suffering of the men in the sea. Both ships had been sunk.

A total of 51 torpedo-bombers and 34 bombers participated in the attacks on the two ships, two G4Ms of the Kanoya Ku and one G3M of the Genzan Ku being shot down (with the loss of all 18 crewmen), while a third G4M crashed due to battle damage on its return to Saigon. In addition, at least seven G3Ms and a similar number of G4Ms returned with varying degrees of battle damage. Although a total of 2,081 men survived the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, 840 were lost including Admiral Phillips.

Singapore was not aware of the attack until Captain Tennant of Repulse sent an emergency signal at 1158, and due to Force Z's radio silence and Phillips' change of plan, GHQ had no idea where the ships actually were. On receipt of the signal two Buffaloes from 243 Squadron were immediately scrambled from Kallang, as was a 4PRU Buffalo, while close behind followed ten 453 Squadron Buffaloes in two flights of five aircraft from Sembawang. First on the scene was FIt Lt Mowbray Garden of 243 Squadron:

Garden's No.2, Sgt Geoff Fisken, commented:

On reflection he added:

Also in the vicinity by now was Sgt Charlie Wareham in the PR Buffalo (W8136), busily taking pictures of the carnage below, whilst close behind came the 453 Squadron Buffaloes led by Fit Lt Tim Vigors, who recalled:

Sgt George Scrimgeour remembered:

As the Buffaloes flew over the mass of struggling men, Tim Vigors believed he was witnessing survivors waving and cheering:

In retrospect it would seem more likely that the survivors he saw waving and cheering were, in fact, shaking their fists at the belated arrival of British fighters, or that they were simply gesticulating to be seen in the vain hope of discovery and rescue by others. An entry in 453 Squadron's war diary added:

Sgt Greg Board was similarly amazed at the scene below:

On their return to Sembawang, the pilots leaped from their cockpits, cheering and laughing. They walked back in high spirits to their bamboo huts, eager to drink to the smashing defeat of the Japanese naval force. They had just filled their glasses when the intelligence officer walked in. One look at his face stopped the pilots cold in their tracks. Then the officer began to talk. Quietly, he broke the news to his audience: ''Those weren't Japanese warships."

When Sgts Weber and Powell of 243 Squadron reached the area, the battle was long over; Weber wrote:

488 Squadron also sent out pairs of Buffaloes to search the area, Fit Lt Jack Mackenzie (W8223) and Sgt Jim MacIntosh making up one section, as the former recalled:

Sgt MacIntosh added:

One of the tragedies of this disaster was that fighter cover could have been provided had Singapore known sooner that Force Z was operating off Kuantan. Admiral Phillips had not informed Singapore of his change of plan on the evening of the 9th. FIt Lt Vigors was bitter about the whole shambles, and later wrote:

This was a view similarly held by Colonel Masatake Okumiya, Staff Officer at JAAF HQ in Saigon, who wrote:

243 Squadron's CO, Sqn Ldr Howell, summed up the tragic fiasco when he later reflected:

On his return to Singapore, the rescued Captain Tennant of Repulse was greeted by an equally distressed Air Vice-Marshal Pulford, who exclaimed:

The loss of Force Z marked the death knell for British hopes of holding on to their Far East possessions. When informing the House of Commons of the tragedy, Prime Minister Churchill commented:

The effects were profoundly psychological as well as material, creating a feeling of hopelessness and a tremendous impression of total superiority in all arms of the enemy. The general effect on British morale and confidence was disastrous. In many, the will to resist now deteriorated rapidly. Worse was to come.